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Abstract  
David Kilcullen, an Australian soldier-scholar who acted as counterinsurgency advisor to both 
the Pentagon and the State Department in the US War on Terror, is refashioning himself as an 
expert on geospatial security and urban crises.  His Out of the Mountains is a Malthusian account of 
urban disorder in the global South, in what he calls “crowded, complex, and coastal” cities as 
terrain of future asymmetric warfare. This review situates his work within the intellectual context 
of counterinsurgency and pacification epistemic community out of which it arises, and addresses 
why his book may have received plaudits from the socialist urban theorist Mike Davis. 
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In a famous 1965 pamphlet, Lin Biao, a theorist of guerrilla warfare and the Defence Minister of 
People’s Republic of China, promised a tidal surge of rural insurrection “first encircling the cities 
from the countryside and then capturing the cities.” The image of a city besieged by rural 
guerrillas then also became a synecdoche for global revolution: “Taking the entire globe, if North 
America and Western Europe can be called ‘the cities of the world’, then Asia, Africa and Latin 
America constitute ‘the rural areas of the world.’ […] In a sense, the contemporary world 
revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas.” 1 The speech 
garnered a great deal of attention at the time, not least from then US Secretary of Defense, 
Robert McNamara who viewed the speech “as something akin to Hitler’s Mein Kampf: a blueprint 
for the eventual destruction of the United States.”2 Where the strategists and policy-makers tried 
to parse the meaning of Lin’s speech for the US involvement in Vietnam, at the operational level, 
military tacticians were moved into action by the enormity of encircled world metropoles, and 
the horror of waves of rural guerrillas.  What the US militarymen considered a nightmarish 
scenario influenced their counterinsurgency practices for decades, and traces of the thinking 
about rural counterinsurgencies –developed in the 1960s in Vietnam– remain still in the 
lineaments of the 2007 version of the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual. 
This geographic imaginary of cities and countryside –neatly sealed from one another– and 
operating according to incommensurate logics remained embedded and predominant in US 
military doctrine.  While the 1960s and 1970s were consumed with devising methods of 
pacification of rural guerrillas primarily in Vietnam, by the 1980s, Military Operations in the 
Urban Terrain (MOUT) had become a significant mainstay of military research and doctrine in 
the US, in response to US military and intelligence activities in the Caribbean and the Middle 
East.  If the material necessity of finding ways to consolidate lessons learned from military 
operations in Grenada, Panama and Beirut counted as one progenitor of US thinking about 
asymmetric urban warfare, the British operations in Northern Ireland served as an even more 
important intellectual touchstone.  There, the most eloquent proponent of institutionalising low-
intensity urban warfare had been General Frank Kitson who had fought in Cyprus, Kenya and 
Aden, and commanded the British forces in Northern Ireland.  Kitson’s Low Intensity Conflict, 
described in the 2007 US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual as an “explanation of the British 
                                                 
1 Lin Biao 1965. 
2 Elliott 2010, p. 141. 
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school of counterinsurgency from one of its best practitioners”3, sought to generalise lessons 
learned in Belfast to not only urban guerrilla operations in the colonies but also to the then-
restive cities of Europe.  In the book, Kitson recounts possible scenarios in which the British 
military could resort to low-intensity conflict, including in “other potential trouble spots within 
the United Kingdom.”4 He writes,  
For the future it may well be that social discontent and racial ferment will be 
more important [than insurgencies], and disturbances arising out of 
dissatisfaction with society, often allied with racial problems which have not yet 
been mastered, are already commonplace.5 
In the US, the idea of urban warfare being used to quell social unrest in cities near and far led to 
a military officer incanting “Tuzla, Mogadishu, Los Angeles, Beirut, Panama City, Hue, Saigon, 
Santo Domingo” as “broken cities” that were sites of possible future warfare.6 The 
interconnections between these cities are even clearer in a more recent article by US Army 
Colonel Robert Killebrew, an irregular warfare specialist, who equates “urban gang warfare and 
terrorism”, Hizbullah and the Crips and the Bloods.  Killebrew even writes of “domestic 
insurgencies” in the article indicating that urban or suburban areas in North America can easily 
become “ungoverned spaces.”7 The equivalence made between a broad range of contentious and 
violent actions across a range of continents and political contexts, the militarisation of domestic 
suppression of local discontent, and the image of cities as distillation of disorder, crime, and 
insurgency recur again and again in the works of military thinkers tasked with imagining futures 
that need to be tamed. 
Among these military thinkers, David Kilcullen stands apart for his range of scholarly readings 
and military credentials; and his Out of the Mountains is perhaps the most articulate extended 
reflection on military operation in urban areas.  Kilcullen is an Australian soldier-scholar the field 
research for whose doctoral thesis was conducted while on military operations in Indonesia. His 
doctoral thesis shows a confident ability to situate his own military experiences (of peacekeeping 
in East Timor) and extensive military connections within a set of theoretical or scholarly puzzles. 
His acknowledgements page also shows the extent to which his research interlocutors were 
drawn from the military sphere.  The work also shows an emerging interest in the geographic 
differences between urban and rural spaces requiring different military tactics for pacification:  
Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population 
groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and 
exacerbate the loss of central control [over an area contested by guerrillas]. 
Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications 
and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis [?] –
particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation- tend to 
slow such diffusion.8 
Kilcullen’s secondment to the US Department of Defense in 2004 and later assignment to the 
US Department of State began his meteoric rise in the US military establishment. His initial work 
concerned counterterrorism strategy and required travel to all the various battlefields of the War 
on Terror, allowing him to extend his networks of both military men and civilian wonks. The 
2006 publication of an article in the Military Review firmly ensconced Kilcullen in the pantheon of 
                                                 
3 US Army 2007, Annotated Bibliography. 
4 Kitson 1971, p. 24. Emphasis added. 
5 Kitson 1971, p. 16. 
6 Peters 1996 quoted in Davis 2006, p.  202. 
7 Killebrew, Robert 2008, p. 12. 
8 Kilcullen 2000, p. vi. 
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soldier-scholars who had become advocates of counterinsurgency as a tactic to forestall the 
failure of the flailing US military in Iraq. 
Kilcullen’s essay, titled “‘Twenty-Eight Articles’: Fundamentals of Company-level 
Counterinsurgency” was self-consciously modelled after an essay of similar name written by TE 
Lawrence in 1917.9  In that earlier article, Lawrence writes not as a counterinsurgent, but as one 
instigating and inciting an insurgency among Arabs fighting the Ottoman military.  Lawrence’s 
“27 Articles” include instructions on how to incorporate a knowledge of the habits and practices 
of Arabs in the practices of war-fighting, advice about the organisation of war-fighting, and a 
discussion of how to best manipulate local allegiances and beliefs.  Kilcullen’s article incorporates 
some of Lawrence’s insistence on local knowledge, and delineates much of the tactical guidelines 
that were to be later included in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. ‘Twenty-Eight Articles’ calls 
for the accumulation of local knowledge, diffusion of military authority from company 
commander level down to squad leaders, coordination with other agencies, working with the 
media, and incorporation of “cultural and political” knowledge. Kilcullen, like Lawrence, is astute 
enough to recognise the complexities of the context in which military men are to operate. Like 
Lawrence, Kilcullen looks for malleable social groups that can best act as allies, proxies and 
nodes of intelligence; for Lawrence these were particular groups of the Bedu; for Kilcullen, they 
are women.  The article has very little to say about geographic specificities of the battlefield.10   
Kilcullen’s next significant contribution to thinking about counterinsurgency was his article in 
Survival, “Counterinsurgency Redux.’”11  This article returns to the notion of “ungoverned spaces” 
that had been central to his doctoral research and in fact emphasises the difficulty of 
counterinsurgency in “urban jungles” where “cover and concealment are far greater.”12  Kilcullen 
then lays out the complexities of military operations in such an environment - not only are 
kinetic (or violent) military activities hobbled by the complexity of the urban environment, but 
so are, crucially, press relations and propaganda by the connectivity characteristic of cities. 
Kilcullen has now written the book on urban counterinsurgencies, after two other books that 
dealt specifically with causes of insurgencies, and strategies and tactics of pacification in the 
twenty-first century.13 His new book, Out of the Mountains, is about contentious and conflict-
ridden coastal cities, and it is exulted not just by the usual suspects –a former UK Security and 
Intelligence Coordinator, the former Director of Operations and Intelligence at the MI6– but 
also by Mike Davis, the Marxist scholar of cities, urbanisation, and slums.  Out of the Mountains 
argues that the kinds of threat we face are no longer the ambushes Kilcullen experienced in the 
mountains of Afghanistan, but emerging urban disorder and unrest.  This disorder is caused by 
“four emerging megatrends of population growth, urbanization, littoralization and networked 
connectivity” (p. 17). Kilcullen delineates the process through which these trends result in state 
failure and the breakdown of governance, and the transformation of overcrowded coastal cities 
into “feral cities” in which crime, terrorism, and local relations of patronage take over.  Much of 
the book is dedicated to analysing the centrifugal forces that operate in these feral cities. 
There is not much that is truly original about the book: its discussion of mega-slums borrows a 
great deal from Planet of Slums.  His explanation of the causes of urban disorder is not too 
dissimilar to that offered by the Modernization Theory of the 1960s, in which revolutions were 
explained as the regrettable side-effects of incomplete modernization in “traditional” societies.14  
                                                 
9 Kilcullen 2006b; Lawrence 1917. 
10 For more on emergence and evolution of counterinsurgency doctrines and practices, see Khalili 2013. 
11 Kilcullen 2006a 
12 Kilcullen 2006a, p. 120. 
13 Kilcullen 2009; 2010. 
14 The most famous practitioner of such theory was Walt Rostow with his The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto.  
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The concept of “feral cities” as “security challenges” was itself first coined by a Naval War 
College scholar, Richard Norton.15 Even the focus on littoral cities as targets of networked or 
distributed counterinsurgency was already well established within military scholarship.16 
But the book should not be dismissed out of hand, if for no other reason than its defence by 
Mike Davis, about which more below.  But there are other reasons too for taking the book 
seriously.  Kilcullen is certainly one of the most thoughtful and erudite of the generation of 
soldier-scholars who have so comprehensively moved not only into the spotlight of adoring 
journalists in the US, but also into the hearts of liberal think-tanks and university departments.17 
He is also famous for having declared the invasion of Iraq as “fucking stupid” and going on to 
argue for ways to extract US out of Iraq (if not Afghanistan).18  
Out of the Mountains itself cites a number of unexpected scholars: from Saskia Sassen and Stephen 
Graham (p. 41) to Mike Davis himself (p.290 inter alia), the great scholar of Iraq Hanna Batatu (p. 
87), James C Scott (though he is misrepresented, pp. 160-161), and the medieval Muslim 
sociologist Ibn Khaldun (p. 88).  He even quotes Marx and Trotsky, the former on “metabolic” 
relations between man and nature (though Marx’s idea is invoked at second hand and via the 
concept of “metabolic rift”; p. 41), the latter on how “war is interested in you” even “if you are 
not interested in war” (p. 24). In his citation of Marx and Trotsky, and a range of Marxist and 
left scholars, Kilcullen follows a tradition within the metropolitan militaries where “the enemy” 
is studied (if not always understood) and their work –whether it is the sociological explication of 
the lives of conquered peoples or military strategies of guerrillas à la Mao or Giap or Guevara– 
becomes the base texts in opposition to which pacification and counterinsurgency tactics and 
strategies are shaped.    
Kilcullen’s book is a carefully written handbook for policymakers and military planners and 
officers about the control of urban areas in the global South. But there are also moments in 
which Kilcullen conveys his own experiences vividly, invoking what he was thinking and feeling 
about urban conflicts. In a telling passage, Kilcullen writes of the sense of dread military men 
feel about fighting in cities, quoting Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down: “It seemed like the whole 
city was shooting at them… Mogadishu was massing in and closing in on them… the city was 
shredding them block by block…the whole fucking city was trying to kill them!”  Kilcullen then 
goes on to confirm this affective state: “These words resonate with what I … experienced during 
the urban counterinsurgency in Iraq: a powerful dread that seems to seep out of the very 
buildings, roads, and other structures of the urban landscape itself” (p. 74). The displacement of 
the affective state of soldiers in a war-zone unto the fixed structures of a city, the projection of 
the subjective feeling of dread unto inanimate objects is characteristic of Kilcullen’s 
representation of cities at war.   
Though Kilcullen draws many of his arguments from the work of urban theorists, not all of his 
generalisations are accurate.  In the Middle East and West Africa, the most intense insurgencies 
are being fought either in predominantly rural hinterlands (as in northern Mali, northern Nigeria, 
northern Iraq, eastern Syria, or Sinai) or in land-locked cities (like Aleppo, Baghdad, Mosul and 
Timbuktu); Libya is the notable exception to this trend. Nor would scholars of Jamaica, Liberia, 
or Latin America agree with the simplistic –not to say moralistic– case studies of urban criminal 
machines sketched in these pages. In describing the social relations in these cities, Kilcullen 
recognises the forms of autonomous organisation that occur because of popular ingenuity and 
collective sentiment, but he only exults those that neatly fit liberal notions of agency and activity 
(for example, exchange rate markets autonomously established in Mogadishu; p.70).    
                                                 
15 Norton 2003. 
16 Schmidle 2004. 
17 Kleinfeld 2009; Sewall 2007. On solider-scholars and security wonks see Khalili 2011, p. 1489 
18 Kaplan 2013, p. 292. 
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Kilcullen is at pains not to portray cities at war as stereotypical dens of villainy, but these cities 
have often already been targets of military or paramilitary police operations, after the completion 
of which Kilcullen or his “frontier consulting” company employees jet in, sometimes embedded 
or part of a military, and dispense wisdom about the complex set of relations they are paid to 
study. This symbiotic relationship between military violence, governmental aid work, and private 
sector developmental and humanitarian consultancy work has at long been a feature of 
metropolitan counterinsurgencies, where asymmetric warfare provide the occasions for the 
remaking of societies, cities, and social relations in the image of capitalist places.19 
The book sits uncomfortably at the intersection of military doctrine, think-tank memoranda, and 
academic scholarship.  I say uncomfortably because the empirical research contained within its 
scholarly scaffolding has been gathered not as part of scholarly fieldwork but during military 
operations or under contract to US and transnational agencies.20 Perhaps most striking are the 
“case studies” Kilcullen includes in the book. These are invariably drawn from the work of his 
private firm, Caerus. Kilcullen established Caerus in 2010, after having retired from government 
service. The company is described on its website as “pioneering a new market—one that 
combines creative tools from industrial and urban design, applied social science, big data 
analytics, and tech innovations for frontier and conflict environments”.21 These neo-imperial 
frontiers –“Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Honduras, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, and Syria” – are traversed by a range of very obviously capable and intelligent former 
officials of governmental and transnational aid and development agencies, aided “by local 
national networks.” 22 These analysts are all attuned to the critiques of orientalism and of 
militarism, and their aims are good liberal aims of improving the natives by bringing them order 
and good governance, if not democracy.  Indeed, there are moments in the book which work like 
an extended business brochure for Caerus and for international private development consulting. 
In the concluding chapter for example, we hear about how Caerus –“we” – “go in on the ground, 
and we engage directly with the people who live there” (p. 242); and the book offers extended 
narratives of various Caerus assignments in Honduras, Libya, Liberia, Somalia and Syria, inter alia. 
Beyond these criticisms, however, lie two much larger problems. First, that ultimately this book 
is a military handbook, and even if the explicitly operational material is moved to an appendix 
(titled “On War in the Urban, Networked, Littoral”), the book’s whole point of view, context, 
and political standpoint are all generated by a military man jocularly comfortable with looking at 
any sign of disorder as something that can be resolved through military operations (or at least 
through policies instantiated by powerfully armed and resourced actors). For example, he 
conflates the “War on Terror” with the “War on Drugs” and any number of other civil wars or 
domestic “disorders” which the US and its allies have sought to militarily remedy: 
Whether the group we’re examining is a militia like the Somali National Alliance 
or Arkan’s Tigers, a street gang like the Shower Posse [of Jamaica] or [the Latino] 
MS13, an organized crime network like the Sicilian Mafia or the Honduran narcos, 
a soccer club like the Ultras or Red Star Belgrade, a mass movement like 
Hezbollah, an insurgency like the Taliban, a terrorist group like al Qaeda in Iraq, 
or a government, the same principles [of competitive control] seem to hold (p. 
245). 
                                                 
19 For more on the humanitarian and developmental characteristics of counterinsurgencies see Khalili 2013. 
20 For example he cites “personal observations … during operations in the destroyed or conflict-affected cities of 
Nicosia (Cyprus), 1997; Arawa (Bougainville), 1998; Dili (East Timor), 1999-2000; Kabul, Khost, Kandahar, 
Jalalabad, and Asadabad (Afghanistan), 2006-2012; and Baghdad (Iraq), 2007” (p. 307 fn. 51). 
21 <http://caerusassociates.com/about/>. Kilcullen has now stepped down from the day to day operations of 
Caerus. 
22 <http://caerusassociates.com/services/> 
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Kilcullen defines the concept of “competitive control” as “the notion that nonstate armed 
groups, of many kinds, draw their strength and freedom of action primarily from their ability to 
manipulate and mobilize populations, and that they do this using a spectrum of methods from 
coercion to persuasion, by creating a normative system that makes people feel safe through the 
predictability and order that it generates” (p. 114).  It is instructive that, originally, the concept of 
“competitive control” had been used to understand various forms of biological pathologies, or, 
alternatively, game theoretic solutions for business management problems.  But perhaps even 
more significantly, “competitive control” is precisely the underlying principle of US 
counterinsurgency practice and theory which Kilcullen and his colleagues have been flogging as 
far back as 2004.  In this reading, counterinsurgency is about competing with the enemy 
(however defined) for control of the population.  As Kilcullen wrote in “28 Articles”,  
This is the true meaning of the phrase hearts and minds, which comprises two 
separate components. Hearts means persuading people their best interests are 
served by your success; minds means convincing them that you can protect them, 
and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has anything to do 
with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what 
counts (p. 136). 
The appendix of Out of the Mountains provides a very clear and comprehensive set of guidelines 
for quelling insurgencies in a densely populated coastal city.  Its clear focus on the geospatial 
planning for the war and the organisational and intelligence needs prior to any invasion certainly 
shows an attentiveness to the full spectrum of military activities required to succeed in complex 
urban environments.  This form of warfare, Kilcullen argues, necessitates weaning soldiers from 
“short-duration operations”, and entails preparation for long term and gruelling “mobile, 
improvisational, expeditionary” operations (p. 294).  So much, so counterinsurgency. 
A far more fundamental problem with the book is its Malthusian understanding of the 
transformations in the world that lead to conflict.  Kilcullen’s vision of the overcrowded cities of 
the world pulsates with a fear, a “dread”, of the poor, the brown, the Muslim hordes:  
The unprecedented urbanization is concentrated in low-income areas of Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa… To put it another way, these data show that the 
world’s cities are about to be swamped by a human tide that will force them to 
absorb –in just one generation– the same population growth that occurred across 
the entire planet in all of recorded history up to 1960… I should mention that 
many places affected by rapid urbanization happen to be majority-Muslim, and 
the takfiri extremists –successors and imitators of Osama bin Laden– will 
undoubtedly keep threatening their own societies and the world at large (pp. 29-
30).  
Here again, are Lin Biao’s developed “cities” of the North besieged by the “rural” insurrection of 
the global South, but with the added garnish of Islamophobic fear-mongering and hydraulic 
metaphors.  The racialised rhetoric, however, is only one aspect of a Malthusian discourse that 
blanches at the idea of newcomers to “nature’s mighty feast”.  Malthus had written:  
A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence 
from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society do not want 
his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has 
no business to be where he is. At nature’s mighty feast there is no vacant cover 
for him. She tells him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he 
does not work upon the compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up 
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and make room for him, other intruders immediately appear demanding the same 
favour.23 
So, in a sense, Kilcullen’s book is also a manual for keeping the “intruders” –presumably 
insurrectionary working classes– at the door and in an orderly queue.  One may wonder, 
therefore, why Mike Davis would endorse such a book.  The endorsement reads: “This is a 
brilliant book by the most unfettered and analytically acute mind in the military intelligentsia. 
Kilcullen unflinchingly confronts the nightmare of endless warfare in the slums of the world”. 
One could argue that all Davis is doing is accurately describing the hyperventilating hyperbole in 
Kilcullen’s work when he writes of this “nightmare of endless warfare in the slums of the world”.  
But also, presumably, these “slums of the world” are not simply laboratories for militarist 
fantasies of forces of order, foremost among them US counterinsurgency planners.  Whatever 
criticisms one may have of Davis’ own Planet of Slums, his book emphatically does not celebrate 
this vision of seething urban hordes in need of pacification by military men.24  In fact, his book 
ends with an eloquently resounding warning: 
MOUT doctrine … is thus the highest stage of Orientalism, the culmination of a 
long history of defining the West by opposition to a hallucinatory Eastern Other. 
According to [theorist of urban warfare] Stephen Graham, this dichotomizing 
ideology - now raised to “moral absolutism” by the Bush administration - “works 
by separating the ‘civilised world’ - the ‘homeland’ cities which must be ‘defended’ 
– from the ‘dark forces,’ the ‘axis of evil,’ and the ‘terrorists’ nests’ of Islamic 
cities, which are alleged to sustain the ‘evildoers’ which threaten the health, 
prosperity, and democracy of the whole of the ‘free’ world.” This delusionary 
dialectic of securitized versus demonic urban places, in turn, dictates a sinister 
and unceasing duet: Night after night, hornetlike helicopter gunships stalk 
enigmatic enemies in the narrow streets of the slum districts, pouring hellfire into 
shanties or fleeing cars.25       
Kilcullen’s Out of the Mountains is precisely the nightmarish illustration with which The Planet of 
Slums ends: not only helicopter gunships hovering over enemies in slum alleyways, but also 
submarine, marine, coastal, riverine and aerial assaults on “an entire coastal strip [which] is one 
giant urbanized area” (p. 280), as well as “precision bombing” (p. 293), securing “expeditionary 
energy” (i.e. fuel for military machines) by any means (p. 282), and the ongoing work of 
“intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” (p. 293).  And yet when Tom Hayden writes a 
review of the book in which he also asks about Davis’ blurb, Davis responds thus: 
While desperate liberals having been seeking light at the end of Obama’s tunnel, 
Tom has been thunderous in denouncing this scary administration’s love affair 
with executive immunity, special ops and universal surveillance. 
But I believe if you carefully read Kilcullen and the literature coming out of 
places like the Naval War College (where they recently had a think-tank 
discussing the implications of ‘deglobalization’), you’ll come to the recognition 
that the Pentagon’s killing machines are not the most profound danger ahead. 
Rather it’s the fact that the military intellectuals are already exploring the 
consequences of writing off the future of a large part of humanity. They see an 
absolute darkness on the horizon.26  
                                                 
23 Malthus 1992[1803], p. 249. 
24 For a criticism of Planet of Slums, see Agnotti 2006. 
25 Davis 2006, pp. 205-206. 
26 Davis 2014. 
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Davis then goes on to convey a story a US Navy admiral told him about the disaster relief work 
the US military does:  
He emphasized that only the US Navy could bring the infrastructure of a 
medium-sized city (in the form of ships supplying power, medicine, supplies, 
helicopters, etc) to a littoral region devastated by floods or quakes. “No one else 
– not China, Russia, the UK or the UN – has this capability.”  
“But here’s the rub,” he said, “Congress will never authorize a serious expansion 
of humanitarian missions, especially when we’re likely to see more Katrinas and 
Superstorm Sandys on our own coasts.” “So at some point,” I completed his 
thought, “no one would ride to the rescue.” 
What Davis fears then is not Kilcullen’s “hearts and minds redux”, but an abandoned “surplus 
humanity” in distress that has been entirely “expell[ed] from the circuits of production” into a 
“vacuum of ungovernability.”27 Here, Davis takes an insight from Marx but interprets it through 
the lens of Malthus.  In Capital, Marx wrote of the production of a “relative surplus population” 
as the “reserve army of the unemployed.”28  But this vision of labourers as surplus to the needs of 
capital reproducing itself is far from the apocalyptic vision of cities in the global South entirely 
filled with superfluous populations subject to “pandemic disease, famine, and unnatural 
disaster.”29 Davis’ demographic nightmare ignores the universality of capital today, and the 
manner in which cities even in the global South, even with vast slums, even on the coasts, 
actually have their own specific relations of capitalist production, with their own capitalist and 
managerial and professional classes, with their own organic intellectuals, and with their own 
specific formation of working class and what Marx called “pauperism”.   
In the mega-cities of the global South, the capitalists live lives not too dissimilar from those of 
the bourgeoisie in New York or London.  And it might be worth remembering that the lives of 
working classes –especially if racialised– in littoral and hinterland cities in the US is as cheap if 
not cheaper than lives in the mega-slums of Mumbai, Lagos, and Rio de Janeiro. In none of 
these places, do the people Davis describes as an abandoned and forgotten surplus population 
would want the “protection” of the forces of order, whether they are dressed in the Robocop 
fineries of the LAPD’s SWAT teams and Rio’s Polícia Militar, or in the climate-appropriate 
camouflage of the special operations forces of NATO, or Russia or China for that matter. Even 
with catastrophic disasters, it is not “humanitarian” militarism that the coastal populations of the 
Global South need, as Davis well knows.  The places where the Pentagon has extended its 
munificence during manmade and “natural” disasters are the same places that it seeks to expand 
its sphere of military influence.  With the work of the Seabees in the wake of the tsunami in 
Japan comes the “pivot to Asia”.  With relief operations after Typhoon Haiyan come expansion 
of bases in the Philippines Archipelago. With the US Army’s Ebola assistance in Liberia comes 
AFRICOM.   
In the end, there are no discernible signs of the US security apparatuses losing interest in the 
slums of the world, or in military humanitarianism. The US military is ramping up the number of 
its military “advisors” in Iraq; it conducts a massive bombing campaign in that country and Syria; 
and is expanding its presence in Africa and East Asia. As to the processes of knowledge 
production that goes into its military planning, aside from the direct and indirect advisory work 
of such people as Kilcullen, the Pentagon continues to fund research about the kinds of disorder 
in the global South that it includes under the heading of national security concerns.  One glance 
at the projects funded by the Pentagon’s Minerva programme indicates as much.  Minerva funds 
                                                 
27 Davis 2014. 
28 Marx 1887, Chapter 25 Section 3. 
29 Davis 2014. 
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everything from “Climate Change and African Political Stability” to “A Global Value Chain 
Analysis of Food Security and Food Staples for Major Energy-Exporting Nations in the Middle 
East and North Africa”; from “Complex Emergencies and Political Stability in Asia” to 
“Tackling Critical Mass Outbreaks in Social Contagions” among many other projects about war 
and domestic disorder.30 
This imperial fascination with urban disorder all too often is concretised through a combination 
of military force, humanitarian and developmental processes, and free-market and corporate 
solutions. If the coming insurrection was once seen to originate in the countryside, the 
counterinsurgents now envision it as a particularly problematic urban malaise. What happens 
after the war is the razing of histories, the making of markets and roads, and the transformation 
of vibrant, chaotic and illegible urban spaces into monitored, surveilled, planned spaces. In 
Kilcullen and other counterinsurgents’ vision for the cities of the global South (and perhaps also 
the global North), the same roads that facilitate commerce also allow the cavalry through; war 
founds the market.  
It is easy to recognise the emergence of massive coastal cities as a global phenomenon at the 
conjuncture of urbanisation, industrialisation and deepening interconnections –via the 
movement of capital and persons and goods, dense webs of transnational maritime, land, and air 
transport, and the virtual blanket of internet connections and mobile phones and satellite 
broadcasts. It is, however, important to acknowledge that these cities are not hermetically sealed 
from a “mythical” rural interior.  We know that the human and “natural” ecosystems, economies, 
social relations, and politics of the cities are far too interwoven with their vast suburbs, exurbs, 
and rural hinterlands. The megacities of the global South are neither abandoned and forgotten 
badlands nor heaving hives of unrest threatening to flood the fat and fortified global North.  
Though both Kilcullen and Davis are right to point out the appalling dearth of public 
infrastructures and the intensity and extent of urban poverty (which incidentally is as intense and 
extensive if not more so in rural areas), these cities are also the loci of economic transformation, 
political mobilisation, and dense and sustaining social relations. 
In the conclusion of Planet of Slums, Mike Davis does sound a single ambiguously hopeful note: 
“the future of human solidarity depends upon the militant refusal of the new urban poor to 
accept their terminal marginality within global capitalism.”31 In the years since he wrote those 
words, the Arab world has seen a revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflagration which 
still blazes in large swathes of the region. Citizens in Latin America increasingly demand a right 
to their cities.  New popular movements have emerged in the Atlantic North and Northern 
Mediterranean, demanding social justice.  When I first wrote these words, the flow of traffic on 
superhighways and the ordinary business of major US cities were being disrupted by activists 
protesting the racial regime of exploitation and militarised police violence against blacks in that 
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